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CANVASSING "POINT OUTS" AND POLICE
SUGGESTION: A COMMENT ON
PEOPLE v. DIXON
Geoffrey T. Raichtt
I. INTRODUCTION
Wade hearings seek to "test identification testimony for taint
arising from official suggestion during 'police-arranged confronta-
tions between a defendant and an eyewitness." In United States v.
Wade,2 the United States Supreme Court noted that one major fac-
t Candidate for J.D., 1997, City University of New York School of Law; M.P.A.,
1992, New York University; B.A., 1990, New York University.
1 People v. Dixon, 647 N.E.2d 1321, 1323 (N.Y. 1995) (quoting People v. Gis-
sendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924, 930 (N.Y. 1979)). SeeYAE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 659 (8th ed. 1994) (Wade hearings
seek "to protect the reliability of the identification process and to make available testi-
mony about the conditions under which such process is carried out ...."); see also
Leonard B. Boudin, The Federal Grand Juiy, 61 GEO. L.J. 1 (1972); Jesse H. Choper,
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1984); Barry C. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenileJustice: Rules of Procedure for
the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REv. 141 (1984); Joseph D. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and
Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Inno-
cent?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1974); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal
Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1985); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNE-L L. REv. 934
(1984); Yale Kamisar, Brewer v.Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interroga-
tion"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. LJ. 1 (1978); FeliceJ. Levine &June Louin Tapp,
The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
1079 (1973); Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguish-
ing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 907 (1989); Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 367 (1992); Charles A. Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The
Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1097
(1974); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The How and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Pro-
cedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 (1980); Louis Michael Seidman,
Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94
YALE L.J. 315 (1984); Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1986-1987, 76 GEo. L.J. 521 (1988); Jeff Thaler,
Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to
Trial, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 441 (1978); CindyJ. O'Hagan, Note, When Seeing is Not Believ-
ing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEo. L.J. 741 (1993).
2 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (applying Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pretrial
lineups). Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel applied
because
of "the accused's inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfair-
ness that occurred at the lineup." The Court was concerned about the
potential suggestiveness of improper lineup or showup procedures. To
protect the defendant from prejudice, the Wade Court recognized that a
507
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tor which contributes to "the high incidence of miscarriage of jus-
tice from mistaken identification has been the degree of
suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution
presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification."3 The
Court further noted that " [s] uggestion can be created intentionally
or unintentionally in many subtle ways. And the dangers for the
suspect are particularly grave when the witness' opportunity for ob-
servation was insubstantial, and, thus, his susceptibility to sugges-
tion the greatest."4 When police officers conduct identification
procedures, the possibility of suggestion is no less serious.5 Often,
shortly after a crime has occurred, police will conduct a "show-up"
where they present the suspect to a witness for identification.6 In
some instances, a victim or witness will only be in the presence of
police, canvassing the area near the scene of the crime, when they
point out a perpetrator.7 Does this situation command a Wade
hearing?8 In February 1995, New York State's highest court ruled
that where the police canvass an area of a crime scene with a victim
or witness in their car and a perpetrator is "pointed out," the iden-
postindictment lineup is a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings,
at which the defendant has a right to counsel. The Court reasoned that
the presence of counsel at such a "critical stage" can prevent prejudicial
identification procedures and can enable counsel to reconstruct and
challenge those procedures at trial.
Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1986-1987, 76 GEO. L.J. 521, 651 (1988) (internal citations omitted).
3 Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
4 Id. at 229.
5 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (the Court extended due process right to
exclude identification testimony that results from unnecessarily suggestive procedures
that may lead to an irreparably mistaken identification).
6 See, e.g., People v. Clark, 649 N.E.2d 1203 (N.Y. 1995).
7 See generally People v. Dixon, 647 N.E.2d 1321 (N.Y. 1995).
8 Canvassing of a crime scene in a police van with a witness is akin to "alley con-
frontations" or "prompt confrontations with the victim or an eyewitness at the scene
of the crime." YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS
AND QUESTIONS 669 (8th ed. 1994). This type of identification has been exempted
from the right to counsel requirement under the Sixth Amendment. Id. (citing Rus-
sell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). However, in pre-arrest and pre-
indictment cases
[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for-
bids a line up that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepara-
ble mistaken identification. When a person has not been formally
charged with a criminal offense, Stovall strikes the appropriate constitu-
tional balance between the right of a suspect to be protected from prej-
udicial procedures and the interest of society in the prompt and
purposeful investigation of an unsolved crime.
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (internal citation omitted).
PEOPLE v. DIXON
tification procedure must be subject to a Wade hearing.9 The deci-
sion enhances due process and may burden criminal court
calendars. However, the New York State Court of Appeals was cor-
rect by affording defendants this extra layer of protection.
While this opinion may be viewed as a branding of police pro-
cedures as inherently suggestive, 10 such a stark view is unnecessary.
While the New York State Court of Appeals' grant of due process
protection was correct, one need not believe that police practices
are inherently malicious and in need of constant oversight. That is
not to say that police do not, at times, disregard certain individual
constitutional protections. However, even the most honest and
well-intentioned police officer may unknowingly taint an iden-
tification.
II. THE ROBBERY OF HAROLD KNOWINGS AND THE ARREST OF
ROBERT DIXON
A group of men robbed Harold Knowings as he exited a gro-
cery store in Brooklyn.' Shortly thereafter, transit police officers
drove Harold Knowings in a marked van around the streets near
where the robbery occurred. 2 During the "canvass," Knowings
"pointed to" Robert Dixon on the street and identified him as one
of the men who robbed him earlier. 3 Based on Knowings' identifi-
cation, police immediately arrested Dixon and charged him with
robbery in the second degree, 4 grand larceny in the fourth de-
gree,15 and assault in the second' 6 and third degrees. 7
9 Dixon, 647 N.E.2d at 1324.
10 Id. at 1326 (BellacosaJ., dissenting).
11 Id. at 1324.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Under New York Penal Law section 160.10, a person is guilty of robbery in the
second degree when he forcibly steals property and when:
1. He is aided by another person actually present; or
2. In the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight
therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
a. Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in
the crime; or
b. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun,
machine gun or other firearm; or
3. The property consists of a motor vehicle, as defined in section one
hundred twenty-five of the vehicle and traffic law.
Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 160.10 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).
15 Under New York Penal Law section 155.30, a person is guilty of grand larceny in
the fourth degree when he steals property and when:
1. The value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars; or
1996]
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The prosecution notified Dixon that Knowings made a "'cor-
2. The property consists of a public record, writing or instrument kept,
filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public
office or public servant; or
3. The property consists of secret scientific material; or
4. The property consists of a credit card or debit card; or
5. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is taken from the
person of another; or
6. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extor-
tion; or
7. The property consists of one or more firearms, rifles, or guns, as such
terms are defined in section 265.00 of this chapter; or
8. The value of the property exceeds one hundred dollars and the
property consists of a motor vehicle, as defined in section one hundred
twenty-five of the vehicle and traffic law, other than a motorcycle, as
defined in section one hundred twenty-three of such law; or
9. The property consists of a scroll, religious vestment, vessel or other
item of property having a value of at least one hundred dollars kept for
or used in connection with religious worship in any building or struc-
ture used as a place of religious worship by a religious corporation, as
incorporated under the religious corporations law or the education law.
10. The property consists of an access device which the person intends
to use unlawfully to obtain telephone service.
Grand larceny in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.30 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).
16 Under New York Penal Law section 120.05, a person is guilty of assault in the
second degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he
causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
2. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes
such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly
weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
3. With intent to prevent a peace officer, police officer, a fireman, in-
cluding a fireman acting as a paramedic or emergency medical techni-
cian administering first aid in the course of performance of duty as such
fireman, or an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency
medical service technician, from performing a lawful duty, he causes
physical injury to such peace officer, police officer, fireman, paramedic
or technician; or
4. He recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
5. For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment,
he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical im-
pairment or injury to another person by administering to him, without
his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the
same; or
6. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, other than a felony defined in article one hun-
dred thirty which requires corroboration for conviction, or of immedi-
ate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes
physical injury to a person other than one of the participants; or
7. Having been charged with or convicted of a crime and while con-
fined in a correctional facility, as defined in subdivision three of section
forty of the correction law, pursuant to such charge or conviction, with
1996] PEOPLE v. DIXON 511
poreal non-lineup identification' in the presence of the police."1 8
Dixon then requested a Wade hearing 9 "to challenge 'the propri-
ety of the identification procedures used.'"2" He argued that the
police identification procedure was "unfair, creating a substantial
likelihood of misidentification."2 ' The People argued that Dixon
was "pointed out" to the police sua sponte by Knowings "during a
canvass of the area surrounding the scene of the crime."22 There-
fore, the People argued that Dixon's identification was not police-
arranged and, thus, he was not entitled to a Wade hearing. 2 The
court agreed and denied Dixon's motion.24
At trial, Knowings testified to his out-of-court identification of
Dixon and further identified him in court as one of the men who
robbed him.25 In his defense, Dixon took the stand and claimed
that while he was near the scene of the crime, Knowings had mis-
takenly identified him as one of the perpetrators. 26 The jury con-
victed Dixon of robbery in the second degree. 27 The appellate
division affirmed both Dixon's conviction and the court's denial of
a Wade hearing.
28
intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury
to such person or to a third person; or
8. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical
injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly
causes serious physical injury to such person.
Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.05 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
17 Under New York Penal Law section 120.00, a person is guilty of assault in the
third degree when:
1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes
such injury to such person or to a third person; or
2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or
3. With criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another per-
son by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.00 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996).
18 Dixon, 647 N.E.2d at 1322.
19 Dixon sought omnibus relief, which included his application for a "Wade hear-
ing to challenge 'the propriety of the identification procedures used' to identify him
as one of the perpetrators." Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1323; see also People v. Dixon, 609 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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III. THE POTENTIAL FOR POLICE SUGGESTION WAS Too GREAT
NOT TO AFFORD DIXON A WADE HEARING
In a five to two decision,29 the New York State Court of Ap-
peals held that the "canvassing" of the streets near the crime scene,
with Knowings in the police van, was "police-arranged" and the
identification susceptible to police suggestion. Therefore, accord-
ing to the majority, Robert Dixon was entitled to a Wade hearing.30
The court began with an analysis of New York Criminal Proce-
dure Law section 710.60,31 "which governs suppression motions
29 Dixon, 647 N.E.2d at 1328.
30 Id. at 1324.
31 New York Criminal Procedure Law section 710.60, which governs motions to
suppress evidence, provides:
1. A motion to suppress evidence made before trial must be in writing
and upon reasonable notice to the people and with opportunity to be
heard. The motion papers must state the ground or grounds for the
motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact, whether of the de-
fendant or of another person or persons, supporting such grounds.
Such allegations may be based upon personal knowledge of the depo-
nent or upon information and belief, provided that in the latter event
the sources of such information and the grounds of such belief are
stated. The people may file with the court, and in such case must serve
a copy thereof upon the defendant or his counsel, an answer denying or
admitting any or all of the allegations of the moving papers.
2. The court must summarily grant the motion if:
a. The motion papers comply with the requirements of subdivision
one and the people concede the truth of allegations of fact therein
which support the motion; or
b. The people stipulate that the evidence sought to be suppressed
will not be offered in evidence in any criminal action or proceeding
against the defendant.
3. The court may summarily deny the motion if:
a. The motion papers do not allege a ground constituting legal ba-
sis for the motion; or
b. The sworn allegations of fact do not as a matter of law support
the ground alleged; except that this paragraph does not apply where
the motion is based upon the ground specified in subdivision three or
six of section 710.20.
4. If the court does not determine the motion pursuant to subdivisions
two or three, it must conduct a hearing and make findings of fact essen-
tial to the determination thereof. All persons giving factual information
at such hearing must testify under oath, except that unsworn evidence
pursuant to subdivision two of section 60.20 of this chapter may also be
received. Upon such hearing, hearsay evidence is admissible to estab-
lish any material fact.
5. A motion to suppress evidence made during trial may be in writing
and may be litigated and determined on the basis of motion papers as
provided in subdivisions one through four, or it may, instead, be made
orally in open court. In the latter event, the court must, where neces-
sary, also conduct a hearing as provided in subdivision four, out of the
PEOPLE v. DIXON
and their disposition."3 2 The court noted that the standard under
this section requires the trial court to "conduct a hearing and make
findings of fact in determining the motion."33 It also noted that
the suppression motion may be "summarily denied 'if no legal basis
for suppression is presented or if the factual predicate for the mo-
tion is insufficient as a matter of law."' 34 The court found that
blame could not rest with Dixon for not alleging facts "describing
the nature and circumstances of the 'point-out' in the police car."
35
The court further noted that the 1986 amendments to New York
State Criminal Procedure Law section 710.60(3) (b) no longer bur-
den a defendant with having to allege facts to support a motion to
suppress an out-of-court identification.3 6 Indeed, the court found
that nowhere is such a rule more valuable than here, where no one
but the witness and police are privy to the exact circumstances of
the identification.3 7
The court then turned to the issue of Dixon's entitlement to a
Wade hearing. 38 The court based its decision on the principle that
"the purpose of the Wade hearing is to test identification testimony
for taint arising from official suggestion during 'police-arranged
confrontations between a defendant and an eyewitness.
' 39
Central to the court's decision, it announced adherence to
"precedent" and utilization of a nonrestrictive definition of "'po-
lice-arranged' procedures."4 ° The court, therefore, did not believe
that it was announcing a new rule, but a natural outgrowth of pre-
cedent. The court rejected the People's argument that "the fact
that [Knowings] 'spontaneously' pointed out [Dixon] removed the
identification procedure-here, the canvassing-from the category
of police-sponsored viewings that warrant a Wade hearing."41 A wit-
presence of the jury if any, and make findings of fact essential to the
determination of the motion.
6. Regardless of whether a hearing was conducted, the court, upon de-
termining the motion, must set forth on the record its finding of fact, its
conclusions of law and the reasons for its determination.
N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60 (McKinney 1995) (internal footnote omitted).
32 Dixon, 647 N.E.2d at 1323.
33 Id.
34 Id. (citing People v. Rodriguez, 593 N.E.2d 268, 273 (N.Y. 1992)).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. (quoting People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924, 930 (N.Y. 1979)).
40 Id. (citing id. at 1327 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting)).
41 Id.
5131996]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
ness identification may be "spontaneous,"42 yet may nonetheless be
prompted by a police-arranged procedure. The court narrowly
defined an identification as truly spontaneous where "a complain-
ant flags down a police officer and then points to the attackers on
the street less than two blocks away." 44 The court found it unmis-
takable that the canvassing of the crime area in a marked police car
was done "at the 'deliberate direction of the State."'
4
Moreover, the instant identification did not fall into the two
recognized exceptions to the Wade requirement.4 6 The court rec-
ognized that an exception to the Wade requirement may be made
when either (1) the prior identification is merely "confirmatory,"47
or (2) the identifying witness and suspect are known to each
other. 8 In either circumstance, the possibility of misidentification
is extremely low. 49 Implicitly, there is no room for police sugges-
tion in either exception.
The court further reasoned that "[w]ithout the benefit of a
Wade hearing, the courts below could not conclude as a matter of
law that [Knowings'] identification of [Dixon] from the police van
was spontaneous and not subject to any degree of police sugges-
tion. " " The court noted that the mere claim that Knowings
"pointed out" Dixon supports the possibility that the identification
was indeed preceded by police prompting. 1 The court found the
circumstances of the canvassing to be no different than a tradi-
tional lineup. 2 Accordingly, "a Wade hearing was required to en-
able the parties to explore the true nature of the facts surrounding
the particular identification-circumstances not ascertainable in
the absence of a hearing. 53
IV. THE MAJORITY'S RULE CREATES A PER SE ENTrTLEMENT
In his dissent, Judge Bellacosa, joined by Judge Levine, would
42 The court exemplified "spontaneous" as when a victim "points out" a defendant
by reflex while viewing a police supplied video tape. While the "point out" may be
"spontaneous," it would be difficult to deny that the viewing was police-arranged. See
id. at 1324 (citing People v. Edmonson, 554 N.E.2d 1254 (N.Y. 1990)).
43 Id. at 1323-24.
44 Id. at 1324 (citing People v. Rios, 548 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)).
45 Id. (citing People v. Berkowitz, 406 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. 1980)).
46 Id.
47 Id. (citing People v. Wharton, 549 N.E.2d 462 (N.Y. 1989)).
48 Id. (citing People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1979)).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1325.
[Vol. 1:507514
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have affirmed the denial of the suppression hearing, because the
defendant failed to show any "'legal basis [or cognizable theory]
for suppression . . .' and no sufficient 'factual predicate for the
motion' to suppress, as a matter of law, [was] advanced."54 The
dissenting judges were most concerned with the majority's creation
of a "virtual per se pretrial hearing entitlement, contrary to [New
York Criminal Procedure Law section 710.60] 's express limitations
and prescriptions."55 The dissenting judges warned that "[e]very
noncustodial street canvass by police with crime victims will hereaf-
ter be preemptively treated as 'police-arranged' and the identifica-
tion as suggestive by its nature."56 Moreover, the dissenting judges
cautioned that the "[u]nnecessary, layered hearings, not constitu-
tionally or statutorily required in fairness, merely provide for indi-
rect discovery, complexity and tactical delay and unjust results."57
They further argued that the identification of Dixon was not po-
lice-arranged. Dixon's identification, the dissenting judges wrote,
"drives the phrase 'police-arranged' inexorably and inappropri-
ately beyond its categorical, functional and particularized pur-
pose."" "The law enforcement authorities did not initiate or exert
this effort with prior knowledge about this or any targeted perpe-
trator. They were simply responding immediately to a civilian
crime victim's complaint."59 This, the dissenting judges asserted,
"is not a situation instinct with suggestibility ..... 0
V. WADE HEARINGS AFFORD DEFENDANTS NECESSARY PROTECTIONS
AGAINST TAINT OF IDENTIFICATION
The New York State Court of Appeals correctly found that the
lower courts erred by failing to conduct a suppression hearing.
Whenever there is the possibility of undue suggestion, either by law
enforcement or prosecutors, suppression hearings should be
granted. While the court's decision may add another layer upon
an already burdened criminal justice system, the court simultane-
ously prevented a potential miscarriage ofjustice where misidentifi-
cation was possible.
54 Id. (citing N.Y. CrmM. PROC. LAW § 710.60 (McKinney 1995); People v. Mendoza,
624 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1993); People v. Rodriguez, 593 N.E.2d 268 (N.Y. 1992)).
55 Id.; see Timothy B. Lennon, Joseph W Bellacosa: Cardozo's Knight-Errant?, 59 ALB.
L. REv. 1827 (1996) (discussing Dixon to illustrate Judge Bellacosa's conservativism).
56 Dixon, 647 N.E.2d at 1325.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1327.
59 Id. at 1326.
60 Id.
51519961
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VI. THE ROLE OF POLICE SUGGESTION IN CANVASSING
"POINT OUTS"
Dixon represents a classic contrast in philosophical beliefs.
The debate may seem to turn on the question of whether police
manipulate and influence witnesses at every opportunity. The five
member majority found, in effect, that they do.61 However, such
polarized views are not necessary to resolve this issue. Even an
honest and well-intentioned police officer may create undue sug-
gestion or taint in identification.
In Dixon, the majority believed that no amount of time was too
short for a witness to be alone with the police before undue sugges-
tion may occur. The majority did not in its recitation of the facts
make any reference to how long the canvassing lasted.62 Thus,
whether the victim or witness is alone with police canvassing the
area for two hours or two minutes, the potential for police sugges-
tion exists and such an identification must be subject to a Wade
hearing. The court stated that the only true spontaneous "point
out" would be where a complainant flagged down a police officer
and pointed to the perpetrators on the street only a couple of
blocks away.63 Accordingly, in New York State, Wade hearings are
likely to be granted in all similar situations.64
While the record is devoid of any direct accusations of police
misconduct, 65 nothing suggests that it is a routine police procedure
to coach or coax witnesses into making identifications. It would be
counter-productive for police officers to routinely encourage false
identifications since most would be unlikely to result in convictions
at trial.66 However, it appears accepted by the Dixon majority and
by the United States Supreme Court67 that such practices do rou-
61 Id. at 1324.
62 Id. at 1322.
63 Id. at 1324.
64 Id. at 1325 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
65 See generally id.
66 A trial may reveal alibi defenses and general inconsistencies that would be un-
likely to result in convictions.
67 In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court gave a long explana-
tion of the possibility of police suggestion in identification procedures.
But the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and
the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is pe-
culiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which
might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial. The vagaries
of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law
are rife with instances of mistaken identification .... A commentator
has observed that "[t] he influence of improper suggestion upon identi-
fying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than
[Vol. 1:507516
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tinely exist. The pervasiveness of this practice is, however,
unquantifiable.
The effect of Dixon is an extra layer of protection against possi-
ble misidentification. Indeed, it is an important layer. In fact, con-
trary to the general tone of this decision, one need not find
themselves on one side of the crime control-due process fence to
recognize it as such. Suggestiveness, resulting in taint of witness
identification, need not take the form of malicious police practice.
Even the police officer who in no way means to engage in a sugges-
tive practice may taint an identification.
A hypothetical examination of the conduct of two different fic-
tional police officers demonstrates this very point. Police Officer
Alpha ("Alpha") is a defendant's worst nightmare and the very type
of police officer from whom the majority seeks to protect would-be
defendants. Alpha is the classic dishonest police officer who does
not exercise care in safeguarding a defendant's due process rights.
He wants to make arrests and does not care how he gets them. For
Alpha, it is irrelevant whether the arrestee is culpable for the
crime. In Alpha's mind, the arrestee is probably guilty of
something.
Alpha responds to a mugging call outside a grocery store.
When he arrives in his police van, the victim is outside the store.
Alpha places the victim in the van and they proceed to drive
around the neighborhood canvassing the area attempting to spot
one of the perpetrators. Alpha could say a variety of things to in-
cite the victim into making an identification (e.g., "he looks guilty
of something" or "doesn't he fit your description"). Indeed, Alpha
may not even direct his comments toward a particular individual.
Rather, he may say things to encourage the witness to pick anyone,
such as "guys that rob are scum and should be locked away." The
victim then wants to make an identification merely to vindicate
himself or perhaps believing he is doing the right thing. It is this
type of police officer that strikes fear in the Dixon majority and in
those in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Police Officer Omega ("Omega") is the antithesis of Alpha.
He is not interested in making arrests at any cost. In fact, Omega is
any other single factor-perhaps it is responsible for more such errors
than all other factors combined." Suggestion can be created intention-
ally or unintentionally in many subtle ways. And the dangers for the
suspect are particularly grave when the witness' opportunity for observa-
tion was insubstantial, and thus his susceptibility to suggestion the
greatest.
Id. at 228-29 (internal citations omitted).
19961
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generally good-willed, honest and concerned with the health and
safety of those victimized by crime. When Omega responds to the
mugging call, he finds the victim in front of the market and in-
quires if any medical assistance is needed. After seeing that the
victim does not require medical assistance, the victim and Omega
get into the police van and canvass the neighborhood looking for
one of the perpetrators. Omega does not try to incite the victim,
but generally tries to be helpful. Based on a description supplied
to him by the victim, he may suggest persons on the street. While
he is trying to be helpful, he has tainted the identification.
Omega may not say anything about the crime and still taint
the identification. Suppose the victim gives Omega a description
of the perpetrators. Omega and the victim then canvass the neigh-
borhood. Omega and the victim could discuss anything. By
chance, Omega stops the conversation because he thinks he sees
someone resembling the description. The victim's attention is
drawn there and the resulting identification would then be consid-
ered tainted. The only way to avoid any type of taint is for the
police officers not to engage in any conversation either amongst
other officers or with the victims. Unfortunately, it is impossible to
safeguard against such happenings.
The dissenting judges were incorrect when they challenged
the majority's characterization of the canvassing as "conducted for
the purpose of obtaining an identification."6" They argued that
"[n]o one could have known that one of the perpetrators was still
at or near the crime scene when the normal investigative canvass
was undertaken."69 The dissenting judges missed the point. First,
what other reason would the police officer and the victim get into
the van were it not to attempt to secure an identification? Second,
the mere fact that the police did not "arrange" potential suspects
does not remove this identification from the category of police-ar-
ranged. The dissenting judges focused on presentation of the per-
petrators, akin to a lineup or a photo array. Its view appeared to be
that it is not police-arranged if the police did not physically assem-
ble the suspects. The majority saw potential for taint on the other
side of the two-way glass. While it is true that the police did not
arrange for Robert Dixon to be on the street at that time, the po-
lice may have said or portrayed something in a certain light to
taint. It is this that cannot be checked without a Wade hearing.
The dissenting judges further argued that:
68 Dixon, 647 N.E.2d at 1326 (citing id. at 1322).
69 Id.
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[T]he law enforcement action here was limited to responding
promptly and appropriately to a crime victim's exigent report of
a crime committed proximately in time and place. The action is
different in kind from the identification techniques, practices
and categories that have previously been curtailed or con-
demned or made subject to per se suppression.7 °
However, surely the same arguments were made when protections
were afforded for lineups,71  true show-ups, 72  and photo
identifications.73
As of this writing, the New York State Court of Appeals has
twice relied upon its holding in Dixon."4 In People v. Brown,7" the
court remanded 76 the proceeding so that a Wade hearing could be
conducted.7 7 In Brown, the perpetrator robbed the victim of jew-
elry "allegedly" at gunpoint.78 The victim and his sister informed
police officers, stationed nearby, of the robbery. 79 In a marked po-
lice car, the victim, his sister and police officers "canvassed" the
adjacent block for the perpetrator. 80 The victim "'pointed out' the
person he thought was the robber, and upon the approach by the
police in the marked car, the suspected robber ran off."8" Chased
by police, the suspected robber ran into an apartment building. 82
Police apprehended the suspect in the building stairwell.8" Police
presented the suspected robber to the victim in the ground floor
stairwell handcuffed and surrounded by police officers. 84 The vic-
tim then identified the suspect as the person who robbed him.8 5
No jewelry or guns were recovered from the suspect.86 The court
ordered a Wade hearing to ensure that the identification was free
70 See id. at 1327.
71 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); see also People v. Chipp, 552
N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 1990).
72 See People v. Riley, 517 N.E.2d 520 (N.Y. 1987).
73 See People v. Rodriguez, 593 N.E.2d 268 (N.Y. 1992).
74 See People v. Brown, 655 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 1995); see also People v. Clark, 649
N.E.2d 1203 (N.Y. 1995).
75 655 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 1995).
76 Id. at 163.
77 Id. at 162.
78 Id. at 163.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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87 Tecufrom police suggestion. The court stated that "[a]lthough the
victim initiated the police chase once he pointed out his alleged
assailant, the resultant showup does not fit into the category of
confirmatory identifications that are recognized as exceptions to
the general requirement of a Wade hearing."8
In People v. Clark,89 "[o] ne of two robbery victims observed the
perpetrator in a neighborhood market, asked the manager for his
address, and then contacted the police with this information."9"
Police escorted the victims to that address and identified their as-
sailant as he opened the door to his apartment.9 ' The court unani-
mously found that the procedure was not suggestive and the
identification spontaneous. 92
However, in Clark, the court affirmed People v. Williams.93 The
court, confronted with a similar situation, found the identification
to be mere "happenstance"94 and upheld the denial of a Wade hear-
ing. In that case, the perpetrator raped and sodomized a woman
in the lobby of her building.95 Two weeks later, a man contacted
the woman claiming to have her passport and identification cards,
which were stolen from her apartment twelve days after her rape.96
The man approached the woman's neighbor in an attempt to lo-
cate her.97 The neighbor described the man to the victim.98 Based
on that description, the woman believed him to be her attacker.9
After conferring with the police, the woman agreed to meet the
man outside of a subway station in order to return her property. ' ° °
The police, in an unmarked police car, escorted the woman to the
subway station.' 0 ' "After canvassing the area several times, the
detectives spotted an individual, who matched the complainant's
prior descriptions, standing by himself atop the stairs leading down
87 Id.
88 Id. (citing People v. Dixon, 647 N.E.2d 1321 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Wharton,
549 N.E.2d 462 (N.Y. 1989); People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1979)).
89 649 N.E.2d 1203 (N.Y. 1995).
90 Id. at 1204.
91 Id.
92 Id. (citing People v. Dixon, 647 N.E.2d 1321 (N.Y. 1995)).
93 609 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), affd, People v. Clark, 649 N.E.2d 1203
(N.Y. 1995) (Williams was consolidated with Clark).
94 Clark, 649 N.E.2d at 1204.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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to the subway." 10 2 The police instructed the woman to remain in
the car and followed the suspect into the subway station. 10 3 After a
scuffle, police arrested the suspect, searched his person, and recov-
ered the woman's passport and identification cards.'0 4 An unre-
lated commotion in the subway station forced the police to remove
the suspect to street level. 10 5 "The [woman] observed the detec-
tives emerge from the station with the defendant, and immediately
recognized and identified him to the detectives as her attacker."
10 6
The woman positively identified the suspect as her attacker by his
distinguished crooked teeth, which she had previously and repeat-
edly attributed to her attacker.
10 7
While on their face these facts appear closely analogous to
Dixon,"' in this case the court of appeals upheld the denial of the
protection of a Wade hearing. The court stated that "[g]iven the
erratic circumstances of the detectives' encounter with the defend-
ant, the resulting 'showup' identification procedure was unavoida-
ble, the product of a fast-paced, uncontrollable situation."0 9
The necessity for the protection of due process is well stated
by Professor Lawrence M. Friedman of Stanford University School
of Law:
In criminal trials, some one man or woman stands in the dock,
facing the raw and awesome power of the state. A democratic
system acknowledges this fact, and is committed to some kind of
balance. 'Due process' is a basic concept of American law. It
has many meanings. One of them, however, relates strongly to
criminal justice. The scales must not tilt too much toward gov-
ernment. Arrests must be fair; trials must be fair; punishments
must be fair. These are ideals (reality is another matter). The
opposite of a democratic society is a police state. This is a state
where the other side, the police side, the government side, al-
ways has the upper hand.110
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See People v. Dixon, 647 N.E.2d 1321, 1322-23 (N.Y. 1995). In Dixon and Wil-
liams, the police canvassed the area near the crime scene. The fact that the canvass
took place shortly after the crime in Dixon and several weeks after the crime in Wil-
liams did not factor into the court's analysis. Accordingly, for comparison purposes,
these cases remain factually analogous.
109 See Clark, 649 N.E.2d at 1204 (citing People v. Dixon, 647 N.E.2d 1321 (N.Y.
1995)).
110 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 55
(1993).
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Professor Friedman's observation is correct. The State pos-
sesses "raw and awesome power."'11 Identifications made solely in
the presence of police officers, where there exists opportunity for
intended or unintended taint or suggestion, is too much power to
remain unchecked. To protect due process, it is necessary to add
another layer of protection. Certainly, a major drawback is that
courts will be forced to conduct additional hearings. The result is
that potential misidentifications will be thwarted. When balanced,
barring extraordinary circumstances, due process must always out-
weigh burdens on the judiciary. The dissent in Dixon argued that
allowing this extra layer of protection would result in delay and
unjust results. 1 2
VII. CONCLUSION
The New York State Court of Appeals has protected those
identifications made in the presence of police that are not truly
spontaneous. The majority and dissent based their decision on
whether there existed the opportunity for police suggestion. The
correctness of the opinion can be reached whether or not one be-
lieves that police officers manipulate witnesses with malicious
intent.
In a scathing critique of the criminal justice system, the exclu-
sionary rule, and the Fourth Amendment, New York State Supreme
Court Justice Harold J. Rothwax noted:
[T]he law is so muddy that the police can't find out what they
are allowed to do even if they wanted to. If a street cop took a
sabbatical and holed himself up in a library for six months do-
ing nothing but studying the law on search and seizure, he
wouldn't know any more than he did before he started. The law
is totally confusing, yet we expect cops to always know at every
moment what the proper action is. It's no wonder that police
officers are somewhat edgy ....
While Justice Rothwax's comments are directed toward a different
amendment to the Constitution than those governing Wade hear-
ings, his observations of the complexity of the law and its impact on
police officers is no less true. Most likely, Dixon will have little ef-
fect on police practices. However, Wade hearings will likely be con-
ducted more often than before. Simultaneously, misiden-
111 Id.
112 Dixon, 647 N.E.2d at 1325 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
113 JUDGE HAROLDJ. ROTHWAX, GuiLTY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM 41 (1996).
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tifications will likely decrease. As a result, due process will be pro-
tected and identifications that survive Wade hearings will be
reliable.

